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Farmer Mac is the GSE charged with creating a secondary market in loans backed by 
agricultural real estate.  The Farm Credit Administration (FCA) has estimated a credit risk 
model for agricultural mortgages.  This model is a key determinant of Farmer Mac’s risk based 
capital (RBC) requirement.  This paper reviews both the structure of FCA’s credit risk model, 
and the data used by FCA’s contractors to estimate the model.  Serious concerns are raised 
about both data quality and the econometric specification in use.  Under Basel II, RBC models 




Farmer Mac is a Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) charged with providing a secondary 
mortgage market for agricultural loans.
1  It is essentially the Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac for the 
farming sector, and enjoys similar GSE status and a similar funding advantage.  Farmer Mac 
opened its doors in January 1988, created by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (PL 101 - 233).  
Its powers were significantly expanded in 1996, and the bulk of its $5.5 Billion portfolio of loans 
and guarantees consists of post 1996 business.  Farmer Mac retains in portfolio over 90% of the 
whole loans that it purchases.   A growing segment of its business consists of Long-Term 
Standby Purchase Commitments, an off-balance-sheet item giving lenders the right to put 
delinquent loans with Farmer Mac for a payment equal to their unpaid principle balance. 
 
The Farm Credit Administration is charged with regulating Farm Credit System institutions, 
including Farmer Mac.  Thus FCA has responsibilities similar to OFHEO’s, which it exercises 
through its Office of Secondary Market Oversight (OSMO).  In fact, the law that mandates the 
risk-based capital regulatory regime for Farmer Mac (1991 Amendments to the Farm Credit Act 
of 1971, PL 102-237) generally parallels the language in FHEFSSA, the statute that governs 
OFHEO’s regulatory regime.  It specifies minimum leverage for on and off balance sheet items,
2 
and a Risk-Based Capital (RBC) regime, measured as the sum of credit, market, and operations 
risk.  The statute specifies that credit risk be measured in a worst case scenario, echoing the 
language in FHEFSSA, that market risk be measured by parallel shocks to the yield curve, that   3
operations risk be a 30 percent add on, and that Farmer Mac be required to hold enough capital 
to withstand 10 years of a stressed environment, defined as the highest defaults over a 2 year 
period in contiguous areas which contain at least 5% of the US population.  Unlike OFHEO, 
FCA was given the right (but not obligation) to consider new business profits (or losses) 
immediately as part of the risk-based-capital regime. 
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows.  First there is a brief discussion of the identification of 
the stress case and the identification of relevant data.  This is followed by an overview of the 
modeling of credit risk, including the sources of data and structure of the credit risk model.  The 
next sections discuss, in order, the logistic regression used to model foreclosure probabilities, the 
Beta distribution used to predict the timing of foreclosures, and the loss given default (severity) 
estimate in use.  The ability of the model to predict credit losses out-of-sample is then discussed.  




In response to the risk-based-capital statute, FCA contracted out a series of studies to identify the 
2 year worst case credit loss scenario called for in the legislation, and to build a credit risk model 
for Farmer Mac’s portfolio.  FCA’s consultants identified the Upper Midwest, Minnesota, Iowa, 
and Illinois, over the 1983-1984 period, as the scenario representing the worst case credit risk for 
agricultural mortgages. This was based on aggregate default information. (Barry, et al 1993.). 
 
FCA’s consultants also engaged in a reconnaissance of loan level data sources.  Serious data 
availability problems were identified.  Many Farm Credit System institutions used a centralized 
servicing facility, which shut down as a result of substantial losses during the mid 1980's farm 
crisis.  This event resulted in the loss of historical loan level data for many FCS institutions.  
FCA’s consultants identified two Farm Credit Banks, the Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul, and the 
Farm Credit Bank of Texas, as still in possession of a long history of loan level data.  Although 
the St. Paul Bank was active in the highest stress region, the consultants felt that the Bank’s 
reliance on restructuring as opposed to foreclosure, coupled with the complexities induced by 
temporary foreclosure moratoria imposed by states in the St. Paul region, limited the usefulness 
of St. Paul Bank data.  Texas was the 3
rd or 4
th most stressed region identified, and its peak   4
stressful period occurred 2 years later, in 1985-1986. 
 
Hence, the strategy followed by FCA and its consultants was to use FCB Texas loan level data to 
build an econometric model of credit risk, and then to extrapolate the credit risk on a loan to the 
1983-1984 Upper Midwest stress scenario.  FCA’s model is documented in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, 12 CFR 650, Appendix A.   
            




FCA’s credit risk model is based on a file of 19,418 agricultural mortgage loans held by the 
Farm Credit Bank of Texas between 1979 and 1992 (see Fig. 1).  This subset of data chosen for 
analysis consisted of loans which would have met, or fallen just outside of, Farmer Mac’s 
purchase guidelines.  The file included data on underwriting variables, such as loan size, loan to 
value ratio, debt to asset ratios, and a foreclosure indicator and foreclosure date, current as of the 
end of 1992.  The file also included an estimate of net losses on foreclosed loans made at the 
time a loan entered the REO portfolio.  There were 180 foreclosed loans which resulted in an 
estimated credit loss in the 19,418 loan file.  All 180 of the loans which produced a credit loss 
foreclosed in 1986 or later, and only 4 of the loans originated post 1986 suffered a credit loss.  
These 4 loans were 1987 originations.   The unconditional probability of a credit loss on loans 
originated prior to 1987 was about 1.5 percent, on 1987 originations about 0.5 percent, and was 
zero on post 1987 originations (see Fig. 2).  A further 208 loans went through the foreclosure 




The credit risk model consists of 3 equations.  One predicts the probability of a loan going to 
foreclosure and resulting in a credit loss, one predicts the timing of the foreclosure, conditional 
on the loan ever foreclosing, and a third estimates the net credit loss on a foreclosed loan. 
   5
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Fig. 2 Foreclosures by Origination Year  7
Foreclosure Regression 
 
The foreclosure model is a logistic regression, with a dependent variable that identifies whether 
or not the loan had resulted in a credit loss by the end of the observation window in 1992.  The 
independent variables consist of non-linear transformations of the initial loan-to-value ratio, the 
initial loan balance in 1997 dollars, and a land price “shock” variable, along with the ratio of the 
stock of debt to the stock of assets, and the debt service coverage ratio.   
 
Eq 1) Credit Loss  = logit (α + ß1 LTV
Γ 1 + ß2 (1-exp
(Γ2 LS)) + ß3 PS (1/(1+Γ3))
Time  
+ ß4 DA + ß5 DSCR) 
 
Where LTV is the Loan-to-Value ratio, LS is the Loan Size (in thousands of 1997 dollars), PS is 
the Price Shock, DA is the Debt-to-Assets Ratio, and DSCR is the Debt Service Coverage Ratio. 
 
Table 1 – Predictor Variables 
 




Intercept   α   = -12.62738     
 LTV   ß1 =    1.91259  Power  Γ1 =  5.3914596 
Loan Size (thousands)   ß2 =    4.55390  Negative Exponential  Γ2 = -0.00538178 
Price Shock   ß3 =  - 0.33830  Dampening %  Γ3 =  0.0413299 
Debt/Assets   ß4 =    2.49482  None   
DSCR   ß5 = - 0.19596  None   
 
 
There are several problems with both the structure of this equation, and the variables used as 
explanatory variables.  The first structural problem is that there is no adjustment made for right 
censoring.  It is likely that some of the loans that survived through 1992 have gone to foreclosure 
after 1992.   While it is impossible to conclusively determine that this is the case without access 
to post 1992 data, it seems likely based on two facts.  First, 18 of the total of 180 loans that   8
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foreclosed with a credit loss completed the foreclosure process in 1992 (see Fig. 3), and 
origination years on these loans ranged from 1980 to 1987.  Second, the peak foreclosure year  
for these loans is the 6
th and over one-quarter of the loans in this population have not yet reached 
their 6
th year.  Thus there is room for a substantial number of loans to have resulted in a credit 
loss that remains unrecorded in this dataset.  Most models of credit risk use a hazard rate 
framework to estimate annual (or quarterly, etc.) loan termination probabilities, and to project 
those rates forward for loans in mid-stream, in order to solve the right censoring problem.
3  The 
use of dummy variables to identify origination years can also be used in the absence of time-
varying variables.  Failing to account for right censoring would generally lead to an 
underestimate of lifetime foreclosure probabilities. 
 
The unique characteristics of this dataset may lead to a further problem caused by the failure to 
deal with right-censoring.  Older loans are much less likely to suffer from an undercount of 
foreclosures.  Because the land price “shock” in this dataset occurs in the very middle of the 
observation window, age of loan is strongly correlated with the land price shock variable, and 
with the measurement error in the dependent variable (see Fig. 4).  Thus, right-censoring may 
lead to a biased coefficient as well as an undercount (at mean values of the independent 
variables) of foreclosure propensities. 
     
The use of an equation to predict unconditional foreclosure rates, rather than conditional 
foreclosure rates (hazard rates), leads to a further problem.  The unconditional lifetime 
foreclosure rate on a cohort of loans may strongly depend on the prevalence of the competing 
risk of loan termination, prepayment (Foster and VanOrder 1985).  Consider, for example, a 
cohort of loans originated in 1982, near the peak of interest rates.  Falling rates between 1982 
and 1985 induced a large fraction of this cohort to prepay their mortgages prior to the end of 
1985.  Thus, much of this cohort would not have survived to experience the 1985-1986 land 
price shock in Texas.  A regression estimated on loans that had passed through a refinancing 
wave, but applied to a new cohort of loans that will not experience a strong refinancing 
incentive, may seriously underestimate the number of defaulting loans, because more loans in the 
new cohort will survive long enough to experience a shock event.  Additionally, the regression is 
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have survived to the date at which the capital test is run - a left censoring problem for the 
application of the risk based capital test to a portfolio of seasoned loans.
4 
 
Again the unique characteristics of this dataset may serve to amplify the problem that arises from 
ignoring the competing risk.  The typical Farm Credit System loan written in the 1970's and early 
1980's was an adjustable interest rate loan, with the interest rate tied to the Farm Credit System’s 
cost of funds, similar to the FHLB's Cost Of Funds Index (COFI).  Post 1979, the Farm Credit 
System was able to capture a large share of the agricultural market, because its cost of funds 
index was, essentially, a weighted average of past and current interest rates.  At a time of sharply 
rising rates, FCS institutions offered lower interest rates than could competitors, who presumably 
priced off the marginal, not average, cost of funds.  However, post 1982 this situation reversed 
itself.  As interest rates fell, FCS’s cost of funds index continued to rise, as old debt issued at 
very low rates continued to roll off, being replaced with new debt at higher rates.  Thus, the 
adjustable rates on FCS loans continued to rise post 1982, while the rates offered by FCS 
competitors began to fall rapidly.  The prepayment wave triggered by this chain of events led to 
severe financial stress at FCS institutions (US GAO 1985).   
 
Post 1986, most FCS loans (and most of the loans in Farmer Mac’s portfolio) are either fixed-
rate loans with substantial prepayment penalties, or rapidly adjusting adjustable rate loans, tied, 
for instance, to 6 month LIBOR.  Neither type of loan is likely to experience an interest rate 
induced wave of refinancings.  Therefore, the reduction in credit risk which stems from 
prepayment (calculated over the entire life of the loan) is likely to be smaller for current books of 





The dependent variable in the foreclosure regression is a 0-1 indicator for whether the loan 
generated a credit loss.  There are 388 loans in the file that completed foreclosure by the end of 
1992.  However, only 180 loans were recorded as generating a loss, and it is this subset of 180 
loans that are predicted by the regression.  The loss variable used to identify this subset is an 
estimate of projected losses made at the time the loan entered REO.  According to FCB Texas 
officials, it was an accounting estimate, and did not include opportunity costs, such as foregone   12
interest during the REO process, which often took 1 to 2 years.  It is also unlikely that Bank 
officials would have anticipated that prices for agricultural land would continue falling during 
the REO process (which they did for most years of the late 1980’s). While it is possible for 
rational borrowers to default when the value of the collateral exceeds the value of the first lien, 
for example, if the combined effect of a first and a second is to more than exhaust the value of 
the collateral, the percentage of foreclosures that resulted in no credit loss, 62 percent, seems 
unusually large in comparison to multifamily mortgages, which are also commercial in nature. 
 
Additionally, work outs and restructurings were excluded from the credit loss variable.  While 
the Texas Bank used these tools much less often than did the St. Paul Bank, they were used on 
occasion.  To the extent that loans were restructured on non-concessionary terms and the 
resolutions were successful, this may be appropriate.  However, this treatment is not correct if 
the restructured loans later defaulted or if the loans were restructured on concessionary terms that 
represented a financial loss to the institution.  The proper treatment for restructurings on 
concessionary terms depends on the answer to a taxonomic issue as to whether the losses should 
be labeled credit or market risk. From an accounting perspective, the unpaid principle balance is 
ultimately recovered, but the market value of a loan restructured on concessionary terms may be 
sharply reduced.  Unfortunately, neither FCA’s credit risk model nor its market risk model would 
capture this risk, as these models are currently structured.   
 
The key independent variable in the foreclosure regression is the “land price shock” variable.  It 
is defined as the smallest increase in Texas farmland prices observed between the year of 
origination and the year of foreclosure termination, or 1992, whichever comes first.  It is 
designed to capture the impact of the -17 percent change in Texas farmland prices between 1985 
and 1986, and is the variable upon which the extrapolation to the worst case (Upper Midwest 
shock of –23 percent) scenario mandated by legislation is based.  Unlike many other models of 
loan performance, no other measure of post-origination price appreciation is used, so that a 3 
year old loan in a state with 2 years of appreciation at 10%, followed by a 17% downshock, 
would be treated as having the same risk as a 3 year old loan with 2 years of 10% depreciation, 
followed by a 17% downshock. 
   13
This definition of the “land price shock” variable leads to several problems, both logical and 
structural, in the regression estimation.  One problem stems from the USDA land price series 
used to measure land price changes,
6 and the timing incorporated in the construction of the 
observation matrix.  The USDA series is an estimate of land prices for farmland made in the first 
quarter of the calendar year.  The regression uses the change in, say, 1
st quarter of 1985 to 1
st 
quarter of 1986 to explain foreclosure for loans originated in 1986, although most or all of the 
shock occurred prior to origination.   Because only foreclosure terminations and the right 
censoring date (1992) are used in the construction of this variable, it is also possible that the 
value assigned to a particular loan is for a shock that occurred after the loan terminated via 
prepayment.  For example, a loan originated in 1980 and prepaying in 1984 would be assigned 
the 1986 land price shock value, because non-foreclosure termination dates are not used in the 
construction of this variable.    
 
The definition used also leads to a serious structural problem for the modeling effort.  The 
definition, greatest (in absolute value) decline in land prices from origination to foreclosure 
termination or 1992, uses the event modeled (foreclosure termination) in the definition of the 
“independent” variable.   Yamaguchi (1991, pp.3-6 and pp.26-27) cautions against the use of 
explanatory variables in unconditional probability models if the value of the variable is not 
determined prior to an observation becoming at risk for the event being modeled.  An important 
reason for using a conditional, as opposed to an unconditional, framework, is the former’s 
ability, and the latter’s inability, to incorporate time-varying covariates. 
 
The definition of the land price shock in this particular dataset had some unusual ramifications 
for the estimated data matrix. Virtually
7 all loans originated before 1987 were assigned a value of 
–17% (the 1
st quarter of 1985 to 1
st quarter of 1986 value) while 1987 originations were assigned 
a value of  -10% (the 1
st quarter of 1986 to 1
st quarter of 1987 value), and post 1987 originations 
were assigned small negative numbers (in the range of -2% to -4%) (see Fig. 5).   Over 95% of 
the loans in the dataset had a land price shock value of either -17% or a small negative number.  
All loans that resulted in a credit loss had a land price shock value of either -17% (98% of credit 
losses) or -10% (2% of credit losses) (see Fig. 6).  Essentially, the regression predicts the slope 
between about -3% and -17%, with all of the loans near -3% having a foreclosure rate of 0.  
There is almost no variation on the key predictor variable to use in ascertaining the    14
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Fig. 6 Foreclosures by Price Shock  16
appropriateness of the assumed functional form. To examine the practical impact of the 
endogeneity of the key independent variable, the data used in the credit risk model was modified.  
The dependent variable was replaced with the result of a random number generator, the SAS 
Ranuni function, designed so that about the same number of credit losses (180) would be 
simulated by the random number generator as were in the original dataset.  This was done once 
under the assumption that annual default probabilities were equal (so that a loan observed from 
1979 to 1992 had 14 times the probability of a default as did a 1992 loan) and again with the 
probability of a loan defaulting in the first 2 years set to 0, the probability of the 13
th and 14
th 
year set to 0, and equal annual default probabilities for the remaining exposure years.  The 
independent variable for the land price shock was then recalculated, and the regression re-
estimated.  A macro did this for 1000 times, for seed values fed to the random number generator 
of 1 to 1000.  In both cases, 100% of the results showed a negative coefficient, significant at 5%.  
Coefficients on the other independent variables frequently changed sign and were significant less 




Three of the independent variables were transformed prior to their use in the logistic regression.  
Each variable was altered with a different functional form, and all functional forms and 
associated parameters were estimated outside of the logistic regression.   
 
 The land price shock variable was modified by a “dampening factor” which reduced the 
magnitude of the shock variable by 4 percent per year, with years measured from year of 
origination to year of land price shock or foreclosure.  As is the land price shock variable itself, 
this dampening factor is endogenous: a 1979 loan that does not foreclose will be “dampened” by 
about 25% while a 1979 loan that forecloses in 1980 will be “dampened” by only 4%.  The 
dampening factor is apparently designed to recognize the possibility that a seasoned loan may be 
less affected by a shock than a newly originated loan, perhaps because prepayments mean that 
the seasoned loan is less likely to have survived to the date of the shock, or because land price 
increases prior to the shock will tend to compensate for the shock.  Since prepayments and land 
price changes have varied substantially over time, and are observable (at least at a high level of 
aggregation), a constant 4% “dampening” may be inadequate to capture these phenomena.    17
    
The LTV ratio at time of origination was entered as a power transformation, so that the variable 
in the regression is actually LTV raised to the power of 5.39.  The power transformation has the 
effect of increasing the marginal effect of a change in LTV as the LTV gets larger.  The loan 
balance at time of origination (in thousands of 1997 dollars) is entered as a negative exponential, 
so that the loan balance independent variable is actually 1 minus e raised to the (loan balance 
times –0.0054).  This form produces a sharp bend in the estimated impact, with increases in loan 
size increasing risk at a diminishing rate up to about $500 thousand, and loan size increases 
causing almost no change in risk for values beyond $500 thousand.  For example, the default 
probability increases by 50% as loan size increases from $100 thousand to $400 thousand, but by 
only 5% as loan size increases from $500 thousand to $10 million. 
 
These non-linear transformations are estimated outside of the logistic regression model.  Values 
for the non-linear transformation coefficients were first selected to produce the largest value of 
the likelihood function.  The variables were then transformed and used as predictors in the 
logistic regression, and it is these coefficients and associated T-statistics that are reported in the 
Federal Register document.  The estimation of these parameters outside of the logistic regression 
procedure renders the goodness of fit statistics reported with the model suspect (Kennedy 1987, 
p. 164).  The endogeneity of the land price shock variable and associated dampening factor also 




Additionally, the definitions of the two equity variables may incompletely represent the concepts 
of initial LTV and shock to equity.  The FCB Texas loans used in the logistic regression were all  
Farm Credit System loans.  FCS is structured as a cooperative.  Borrowers using the system must 
purchase stock in their local lender, and this stock cannot be redeemed until the loan is paid-off.  
In effect, the stock purchase at time of origination can act as extra equity.  Prior to 1986, stock 
purchase requirements were generally 10% of the initial loan balance.  Stock purchase 
requirements were substantially eased in the mid 1980’s, with typical requirements in the range 
of 2% to 5%.  Therefore, most of the loans at risk of foreclosure would have had substantially 
more stock serving as an equity cushion than would the later loans in the dataset, or the FCS   18
loans now purchased by Farmer Mac.  And the non-FCS loans purchased by Farmer Mac would 
not have any stock purchase requirement.
8 
 
The land price shock variable does not encompass all the shocks to equity contemplated by the 
stress scenario.  The stress scenario encompasses both a credit shock and stressful parallel shifts 
to the yield curve.  Most fixed rate loans now purchased by Farmer Mac have substantial 
prepayment penalties, often taking the form of yield maintenance.
9  In many cases, their current 
pay-off amounts may substantially exceed their unpaid principle balances, as interest rates have 
generally been declining (even in the case of flat interest rates, the penalty may be over 5%).  In 
the case of interest rate declines occurring at the same time as a land price shock, the fixed rate 
loans in the portfolio would experience a substantial increase in their pay-off amounts at the 
same time that the value of the collateral declined.  To the extent that erosion of equity
10 from 
prepayment penalties led to foreclosures and recoveries less than the book value of the mortgage 
it would seem appropriate to treat this as an additional source of credit losses.  To the extent that 
it might lead to the failure to collect contractually stipulated prepayment penalties it offers 
another point of debate over whether to classify these losses as credit losses or market losses,
11 





Because the credit risk regression produces a lifetime probability of default rather than an annual 
probability of default, some mechanism is required to distribute these projected losses over time.  
The technique used in FCA’s model is to fit the two parameters of the Beta distribution to the 
distribution of observed foreclosure times in the FCB Texas data (see Fig. 7), assuming that the 
last year in which a loan can enter foreclosure is year 14.   
 




With  π = 4.288  and  θ  = 5.3185 and  Γ  representing the Gamma function   19
 
 












Age of Loan in Years
Fig. 7 Foreclosures by Duration  20
No correction is made for the right-censoring of the FCB Texas data at 1992.  In general, this 
technique will lead to a bias towards an early mean for foreclosure dates, as foreclosures 
occurring early in loan lives will be over-represented.  All foreclosures occurring in the first year 
will be captured in the data, but foreclosures occurring, for example, in the 10
th year, will only be 
recorded for loans originated in 1983 or earlier.  A simple simulation was run, with origination 
years from 1979 to 1992, and with foreclosures following a triangular distribution between the 
2
nd and 12
th years, with a peak foreclosure probability of 0.005 in the 7
th year.  If the observation 
window runs at least 12 years past the last origination date, the simulation returns a mean time to 
foreclosure of 7 years.  But if the last observation occurs 5 years after the last origination date, 
the mean time to foreclosure is only 6.6 years, and if the last observation occurs in the same year 
as the last origination date (as is the case with the dataset used in the FCA model) the mean 
observed time is only 6.4 years. 
 
Additionally, the parameters of the Beta distribution are estimated independently of the risk 
parameters in the logistic regression.  Most credit risk models take the form of a proportional 
hazards model, in which a baseline hazard rate (which serves a purpose analogous to the Beta 
distribution in the FCA model) is estimated jointly with the coefficients of the independent 
variables
12.  The fact that the Beta distribution is estimated independently of the risk factors 
renders its parameter estimates sensitive to the timing of shock events in the data.  If a shock 
event occurs near the end of a data set all surviving loans will experience an increase in 
foreclosures, whereas if a shock occurs near the beginning of a data set loans only the earliest 
loans, with the longest observation windows, are affected.  For example, a simulation similar to 
the above was run, and loans originated before a “shock” date had their annual foreclosure 
probability tripled after the shock date.  If the shock date occurred late in the observation 
window, in this case 1990, there was almost no effect on the estimated times to foreclosure – the 
mean rose from 7 to 7.01.  But if the shock occurred near the beginning of the observation 
window, at 1980, mean foreclosure time rose to 7.24.  For a shock similar to that in the dataset 
used in the FCA model, occurring in 1986, mean foreclosure time rose from 7 to 7.11. 
   21
Severity 
 
The final step in the credit risk model is the assignment of a severity rate to the loans that are 
predicted to default.  The model uses the average severity observed in the loans in the Texas data 
that foreclosed with an estimated credit loss.  That severity is 20.9%, which is roughly the 
weighted mean of the ratio of losses to loan balance at origination for all 180 loans which had a 
non-zero loss.  Losses are not modeled as a function of underlying variables. 
 
EQ 3)  LGD = 0.209 
 
As noted previously, the severity measure is based on an accounting estimate made when the 
loan entered REO.  Important economic losses, such as foregone interest, were not captured. At 
the time when most losses were occurring, the late 1980's, interest rates on agricultural real estate 
were near 10 percent, and time in the REO inventory averaged between 1 and 2 years.  
Additionally, prices continued to decline for most of the post 1986 period, which may have 
lowered the prices actually realized for foreclosed property.  The extent to which bank officials 
had incentives to accurately anticipate future losses during a financial crisis is unclear. 
 
To the extent that severity may have been underestimated in the data, adjusting for these issues 
would tend to increase measured severity on the 180 loans with credit losses in the data.  To the 
extent that severities are underestimated, and the foreclosures without credit loss in the model 
estimation are actually foreclosures with credit losses, the severity rate may be overestimated, as 
some loans with low severities may be excluded from the calculation.   While loss given default 
may be either over or underestimated based on the above, the product of the default rate and the 




Fortunately, there has been no stressed time period for which stress results can be compared to 
an out of sample prediction from the model.  However, the model’s estimate of the slope of the 
price-shock -> credit loss relationship is anchored at two points, price shocks –3% and price-
shocks of about –17%.  Current experience does allow a test of the predictive power of the model   22
in the unshocked range, by comparing model predictions with aggregate credit losses reported by 
Farmer Mac. 
 
Since loan level data for Farmer Mac’s portfolio are not public, assumptions must be made about 
the distribution of risk characteristics for the loans in their portfolio.  For purposes of this 
comparison, a worst case is assumed, setting all the risk variables in the model to the riskiest 
level that Farmer Mac will generally purchase.  Farmer Mac will generally not buy loans in 
excess of $1 million, but in certain circumstances, loan balances can be as high as $10 million in 
current dollars.  In general, Farmer Mac will not buy a loan with LTV greater than 0.70.
13  
Similar restrictions apply to Debt/Assets (maximum generally 0.5) and DSCR (maximum 
allowed of 1.25).  Farmer Mac will purchase a loan that exceeds the standard on one 
underwriting variable, but not on all, and not without compensating factors.   No loan would be 
purchased with both an LTV of more than 0.75 and a Debt/Assets of more than 0.5.  In their 
2003 annual report Farmer Mac indicates that only about 3% of their credit losses are from loans 
that exceeded 70% initial LTV.  In testimony before the House Agriculture Committee, Farmer 
Mac’s CEO indicated that their weighted average LTV was under 50% (Farmer Mac 2004).  For 
these simulations initial LTV’s are set to 0.75, and Debt/Asset ratios are set to 0.5, the Debt 
Service Coverage Ratio is set to 1.25, and the loan size is set to $11 million (1997 dollars).  
These values should produce a loan at the extreme of Farmer Mac’s risk tolerance. 
 
 For the first comparison, all loans are assumed to be in their peak foreclosure year, the 6
th year 
after origination.  The credit risk model is used to forecast credit losses with the above worst case 
risk parameters as described above, for various levels of the price-shock variable, always 
assuming that the price shock occurs in the first year of loan life, the year with the biggest impact 
on credit loss.  The Lifetime Foreclosure column is the probability of a loan going to foreclosure 
and resulting in a credit loss, calculated from the logistic regression.  The Annual Foreclosure 
column multiplies the previous column by 0.168, to reflect the fraction of all foreclosures 
foreclosing in the 6
th (peak) policy year, calculated from the Beta distribution.  The Credit Loss 
columns multiply the respective Foreclosure columns by 0.209, to reflect the loss severity rate 
assumed in the model.  The results are as follows: 
   23
Table 2 – Foreclosure Rates and Credit Loss Rates Predicted by RBC Model 
(all figures in percent) 
 








0 0.127  0.021  0.027  0.004 
-2 0.250  0.042  0.052  0.009 
-4 0.491  0.082  0.103  0.017 
-6 0.961  0.161  0.201  0.034 
-8 1.872  0.314  0.391  0.066 
-10 3.618 0.608  0.756  0.127 
-12 6.876 1.155  1.437  0.241 
-14 12.683  2.131  2.651  0.445 
-16 22.223  3.733  4.645  0.780 
Price Shock is the value of the predictor variable, maximum land price decline.  Lifetime 
Foreclosure is the predicted probability from the logistic regression using that value of Price 
Shock.  Annual foreclosure is the Lifetime Foreclosure times the fraction of loans foreclosing in 
the peak year (0.168), estimated from the Beta distribution.  Lifetime Credit Loss is the Lifetime 
Foreclosure Probability times loss severity (0.209), and Annual Credit Loss is the Annual 
Foreclosure Rate times loss severity. 
 
These results may be compared with credit losses reported in Farmer Mac’s 2003 annual report.  
Annual charges for its $5.5 billion portfolio of loans and guarantees are reported to be just over 
$5 million, for a charge-off rate of about 9 basis points.  As Farmer Mac reports about $1 billion 
in new purchases for the year, (which are too recent to have produced credit losses and lie 
outside the scope of the 6
th policy year worst case assumption), a fairer estimate is about an 11 
basis point annual charge-off rate for seasoned loans.  According to USDA NASS data, the worst 
price shock between 1994 and 2003 was in North Dakota, and was a fall of one-quarter of one 
percent.  None of the western states in which Farmer Mac’s loans are concentrated experienced 
any fall in farm real estate prices between 1994 and 2003.  For the U.S. as a whole, USDA 
estimates a fairly steady increase in farmland real estate prices of about 5 per cent per year.  
Therefore, a conservative choice for an out of sample prediction is the first row, with a price   24
shock of zero.  Farmer Mac’s annual charge off rate is more than 20 times the rate predicted by 
the credit risk model at a price-shock of zero, and is consistent with a price shock of between 8 
and 10 per cent.  To the extent that Farmer Mac’s portfolio consists of better credit risks than 
those assumed in this worst-case analysis, the corresponding price-shock would need to be even 
more adverse. 
 
Farmer Mac’s 2003 annual report also gives cumulative net loss rates by cohort.  Cumulative 
loss rates are as follows:  for 1996, 0.35%, for 1997, 0.46%, for 1998 0.24%, for 1999 0.13%, 
and for 2000 0.23%.  These 4 to 8 year loss rates all exceed the predicted lifetime loss rate for a 
price-shock of zero, and even exceed the predicted lifetime loss rates for a price shock of  –4%.  
Using the Beta distribution estimates, it can be shown that a lifetime loss rate should be about 6 
times the 4 year loss rate, and be about 50% larger than the 8 year loss rate.  Extrapolating the 
cumulative loss rates to lifetime rates via the credit risk model’s Beta distribution yields 
predictions consistent with shocks between -8% and -12%.  Again, to the extent that Farmer 
Mac’s portfolio consists of loans safer than the worst-case calculations given here, the 
corresponding price shock consistent with these net loss rates would be correspondingly more 
adverse. 
 
The credit risk model substantially underpredicts risk at the safe end of the price-shock spectrum.  
As the price-shock foreclosure relationship is estimated off of two clusters of loans, those with 
shocks near –3% and those with shocks near –17%, it’s inability to predict credit losses in the 
small shock region calls into question its ability to accurately estimate the slope of the price-
shock foreclosure relationship, hence the reliability of the credit risk model’s extrapolation
14 to a 
price shock of –24%.  The consequences for the risk-based capital standard are unclear.  If this 
result is driven by incomplete data at the safe end of the spectrum caused, for example, by right 
censoring of the loans not experiencing a price-shock, then the regression may overestimate the 
slope of the relationship, and project a higher capital requirement than is necessary.  However, if 
the underprediction is driven by an undercount of credit risk in all ranges of the estimation 
sample, caused for example by zero credit loss foreclosures actually having credit losses, or 
estimation sample loans prepaying before experiencing the competing risk of default, the model 
may project a risk based capital requirement that is too small. 
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Conclusions 
 
FCA's credit risk model, as currently implemented, has several limitations, both with respect to 
the data used in the analysis, and the structure of the equations in the econometric analysis of that 
data.  The impact of these limitations is not clear.  Some, such as the understatement of 
severities, probably lead to an underestimate of the credit risk on agricultural mortgages (unless 
there is a strong offsetting correlation between understatement and price shocks that flattened the 
price-shock foreclosure relationship).  Others, such as the endogeneity of the land price shock 
variable, probably lead to an overestimate of credit risk.   
 
A good estimate of the credit risk on these mortgages is important for managing the taxpayer's 
exposure to the implicit guarantee of the debt on this GSE.  It is important to get both the 
required level of capital right, and to correctly estimate the marginal contribution to risk of 
different variables that may influence risk.  For example, if large embedded prepayment 
penalties (such loans are common in a falling interest rate environment) increase risk, but the 
regulatory model in use does not capture the increased risk, the regulated institution has a 
regulatory incentive to purchase seasoned loans with large embedded penalties rather than newly 
originated loans with smaller penalties. 
 
It is prudent to improve both the credit risk model and the underlying data.  The data could be 
improved via updating the dataset with post 1992 terminations on the loans in the current model, 
and perhaps with post 1992 originations and terminations.  Further refinements may be more 
speculative in nature, but it would be worth exploring many possibilities.  For example, it may be 
possible to create an estimated prepayment date from the payment history file, so that competing 
risks and conditional default rates can be modeled.  If not, aggregate FCS data or data from other 
FCS institutions may be used to produce an estimate of annual prepayment probabilities, so that 
loans known to have terminated by the end of 1992 could be probabilistically censored in earlier 
years.  There may be other sources of data on actual economic losses, versus estimated 
accounting losses.  Perhaps a random sample of foreclosed loans could be compared to actual 
county records of sales prices and dates for the REO collateral.  Initial LTV's in the Texas data 
can be adjusted for stock purchase requirements, and the regulator could collect sufficient data to 
measure stock purchase, compensating balances, etc., so that the adjusted figures can be used to   26
project credit risk on the loans in Farmer Mac's portfolio. It may be possible to use data on dates 
and geographic locations to tie together the old and new loans that result from restructuring, so 
that their performance can be modeled jointly. 
 
The credit risk model could itself be improved in several dimensions.  A hazard rate framework 
could solve the endogeneity of the key independent variable, land price shock.  If the data 
permit, a competing risks framework could be adopted to reflect the substantial differences in 
prepayment incentives between the loans in the analysis dataset and the loans currently 
originated.  Finally, more variables could be incorporated, such as the term of the mortgage, 
updated equity estimates stemming from amortization and land price changes, and erosions of 
equity stemming from prepayment penalties. 
 
The risk-based capital constraint on Farmer Mac is not currently binding.  The leverage capital 
requirement substantially exceeds the risk-based capital requirement.  Thus, there is time to 
improve the modeling of the risk on agricultural loans before risk-based capital becomes a 
binding constraint. 
 
As the Basel II regulatory regime comes into force, more and more institutions will be building 
their own credit risk models for regulatory capital purposes.  Financial regulators need to 
establish criteria for acceptable credit risk models, and will also need to develop the capacity to 
identify flawed models before they are deployed. 
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Footnotes 
 
                                                 
1 Substantial background information on Farmer Mac, FCA, and FCA’s risk based capital 
modeling can be found in GAO’s report on Farmer Mac (US GAO 2003).  This report and other 
post 1994 GAO reports are available at http://www.gao.gov. 
2Capital must be at least 2.75 % of on-balance sheet assets plus 0.75% of off-balance sheet 
obligations, somewhat higher than the leverage requirements on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
3For example, OFHEO uses a competing risks hazard rate framework for assessing residential 
mortgage risk (OFHEO 1999), GAO (US GAO 1993, 1996) and HUD (Price-Waterhouse 
Coopers 1997) have used a competing risks hazard rate framework for assessing residential 
mortgage insurance costs and SBA uses a competing risks hazard rate framework to estimate the 
costs of guaranteeing small business loans (US GAO 2004). 
4 “Unconditional probabilities are sufficient for unseasoned loans, while conditional probabilities 
are essential for seasoned loans.”  (Capozza, Kazarian, and Thomson, 1998). 
5 The CFR document which describes the model indicates that the consultants who built the 
model did not have access to “prepayment information.”  However, a previous paper (Barry, et al 
1993) indicates that they did have access to a file of loan payment information, but did not use it.  
For a loan with a terminated status code, assuming a prepayment near the date at which regular 
payments cease should be a reasonable approximation. 
6 The estimation of the model used USDA ERS Statistical Series 86010,  Farm Real Estate 
Values, which was superseded by a USDA NASS series in 1996.  The “as of” date varied over 
time, sometimes January or February of the year, sometimes April 1
st (ie, the first day of the 2
nd 
quarter).  This series can be downloaded at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/archive/86010/ 
7About 20  ( 0.1% of the population) loans entered foreclosure before 1986 but did not result in a 
credit loss.  These were assigned larger positive values for the land price change variable.) 
8 Lenders may have other forms of protection, such as requirements for compensating balances.  
The loans in Farmer Mac’s portfolio may well have such extra protections.  The point of the 
discussion is that mechanisms that can act like equity, such as mandatory stock purchases or 
compensating balances, should be included in the analysis. 
9 A suggested formula for the yield maintenance penalty can be found in Farmer Mac’s Seller-
Servicer Guidelines.  The formula is similar to that contained in Fannie Mae’s DUS manual, 
which is discussed in Kelly and Slawson (2001). 
10 I am not aware of any paper that explicitly treats prepayment penalties as a risk factor in 
mortgage foreclosures.  However, many papers use the market value, as opposed to the book 
value, of the mortgage in a determination of an equity variable, which results in a similar 
calculation.  For example, VanDell et al (1993) use market value in a model of commercial 
defaults.  Kelly (1998) provides evidence that prepayment penalties erode equity.  Capozza, 
Kazarian, and Thompson (1998) discusses the insufficiency of a book equity concept, and 
suggests additional variables be added to the regression to capture book-market differences if the 
book equity concept is used.  
11 The Bank for International Settlements defines credit risk as “the potential that a bank 
borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms”  (BIS 
2001, p. 1).  Since prepayment penalties are one of the “agreed terms” the BIS definition would 
seem to encompass a failure to pay these penalties.  However, conversations with several risk   30
                                                                                                                                                             
managers and regulators indicate that this risk is treated as market risk, since it stems from 
fluctuations in interest rates, when it is treated at all. 
12 For example, GAO’s report on FHA (US GAO 1996) uses Heckman’s CTM software to 
estimate Box-Cox baseline hazards simultaneously with risk factors such as equity and a 
Heckman-Singer non-parametric heterogeneity distribution.  Deng, Quigley and VanOrder 
(2000) estimate a similar model on Freddie Mac data with non-parametric baseline hazards 
simultaneous with risk factors and Heckman-Singer non-parametric heterogeneity. 
13 Farmer Mac’s underwriting guidelines generally specify a 0.70 LTV limit, but certain cash 
window loans allow LTV’s up to 0.75.  Part Time Farmer loans allow an LTV up to 0.85, but 
this program is very small and requires substantial private mortgage insurance. 
14 The model actually linearizes the functional form at the –17% price shock, but the linearized 
slope is still a function of the slope of the logistic regression, estimated between -3% and –17%. 